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Assessing the Responsiveness of
Spanish Policymakers to the Priorities
of their Citizens
LAURA CHAQUE´S BONAFONT and ANNA M. PALAU
This article analyses how well Spanish political elites have responded to the issues
signalled as priorities preferred by Spanish citizens from the early 1990s to the present,
and to what extent the degree of correspondence between citizens’ and policymakers’
priorities is related to elections, type of government, issue jurisdiction and institutional
friction. To measure this the authors rely on Most Important Problem surveys and
several databases on laws, bills, oral questions and annual speeches, coded according to
the comparative agendas project. They argue that the prioritisation of issues by political
elites better matches public preferences at the agenda-setting stage than at the decision-
making stage, and that correspondence of public and policymakers’ priorities is
inversely related to institutional friction. The evidence also illustrates that policymakers
are more responsive to public priorities on those issues without shared jurisdiction, when
the executive governs without a majority and immediately after elections.
Most Spanish citizens believe that policymakers do not respond to their
preferences and that there is an increasing distance between the policies they
signal as the most important and policy decisions (Martı´nez and Crespo
2006). In 2009, more than 70 per cent of Spanish citizens believed that
policymakers were not very concerned about what they thought, and almost
80 per cent considered that their ability to influence the policymaking
process was almost non-existent. These attitudes have proven to be quite
stable over time, in contrast to political discontent or satisfaction with the
performance of the incumbent government, which has fluctuated according
to economic and political circumstances from the democratic transition to
the present (Gunther and Montero 2009). This way of thinking contradicts
existing empirical analyses of political responsiveness. As Manin et al.
(1999: 18) and Manza and Lomax (2002) emphasise, existing research
demonstrates that there is some correspondence between public opinion and
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policy, and that policymakers more often than not follow public preferences
in advanced democracies.
In line with this, the aim of this article is to analyse whether Spanish
policymakers have been paying attention to the issues signalled as priorities
by Spanish citizens from the early 1990s to the present, and to what extent
variations in the degree of correspondence between citizens’ and policy-
makers’ priorities are related to institutional factors. From different
perspectives, scholars have analysed the correspondence between public
opinion and political behaviour as a means to better understand the
functioning of democracy (Page and Shapiro 1983; Page 1994; Erickson
et al. 2002; Manza and Lomax 2002; Przeworski et al. 1999). Some existing
empirical research compares the attitudes of representatives and constitu-
ents, focusing on the correspondence between legislators’ policy positions –
often measured by roll-call votes – and their constituents’ policy preferences,
measured by opinion polls (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963; Weisberg 1978;
Burden 2007).
Recent analyses of agenda-setting develop an alternative approach more
focused on policy priorities (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In order to
explore the relationship between public preferences and the political agenda,
Jones et al. (2009) analyse the extent to which the issues prioritised by
policymakers in different policy venues (speeches, bills, laws, budgets, etc.)
match those issues prioritised by the general public in the US from 1945 to
the present. From a similar perspective, Soroka and Wlezien (2004, 2010)
develop a cross-national comparison of the correspondence between public
preferences and public spending in Canada, the UK and the US in order to
test their thermostatic model of opinion and policy. Following this model,
Jennings and John (2009) analyse the reciprocal relationship between the
issues prioritised by the executive in the Queen’s Speeches and public
opinion in the UK; and Binzer and Klemmensen (2005, 2008) analyse to
what extent the issues prioritised by the executive in speeches and public
spending have corresponded to public preferences in the UK, Denmark and
the US over the last few decades.
In this article we follow this agenda-setting approach to the study of
political responsiveness in Spain. To focus on the Spanish case is in itself a
contribution, as most empirical analyses of the link between political
activities and public preferences focus on the US and, more recently, the
UK, Canada or Denmark. The questions we address are (1) whether
Spanish policymakers respond to issues signalled as priorities by citizens
(Manza and Lomax 2002); (2) whether the correspondence between
parliamentary and public priorities is related to institutional factors such
as political decentralisation, type of government and the electoral process
(Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Binzer and Klemmensen 2005, 2008); and (3) to
what extent variations in correspondence between citizens’ and policy-
makers’ priorities can be explained by institutional friction (Jones et al.
2009, Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 707
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To answer these questions we have measured public preferences using
Most Important Problem surveys, and policymakers’ activities using the
information provided by databases – on laws, bills, oral questions and
annual speeches by prime ministers – created by the Spanish policy agendas
project (http://www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas) following the methodol-
ogy of the comparative agendas project (Baumgartner and Jones 1993;
Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Our results indicate that the Spanish case
corroborates the hypothesis of previous research on correspondence: public
policy seems to follow public opinion, although large differences exist across
policy areas and policy venues (Manza and Lomax 2002). First, following
the work developed by Jones and Baumgartner (2001, 2005) and Jones et al.
(2009), we arrive at the conclusion that public and policymakers’ priorities
are inversely related to institutional friction – the higher the institutional
friction, the less responsive the policymaking channel to citizens’
preferences. Second, in line with Soroka and Wlezien (2010), we present
some evidence as to the importance of political decentralisation: the higher
the degree of political decentralisation, the lower the correspondence
between public opinion and parliamentary activities at the national level.
Finally, the evidence presented here for the Spanish case suggests that
policymakers respond better to public preferences immediately after
elections and when the government has no majority in Parliament, which
corroborates previous analyses of the UK and Canada (Jennings and John
2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
The article is organised as follows. We first develop several hypotheses as
to how far variations in the degree of correspondence between citizens’ and
policymakers’ priorities are related to institutional factors. The second
section explains the methodology and data. Based on this, the third section
describes the evolution of public and political agendas in Spain from 1994 to
2007, and the fourth section analyses the correspondence between the two.
The last part of the article discusses to what extent correspondence between
the priorities of the public and policymakers is explained by institutional
friction, political decentralisation, type of government and the electoral
process.
Are Policymakers Responding to Public Priorities?
Correspondence between what the public identifies as its major concerns
and policymakers’ activities exists and is expected in a democracy (Manin
et al. 1999). A government will respond to the interests and preferences of
citizens because, in democracies, politicians suffer the consequences of their
policies and unpopular policies make them lose elections (Maravall 1999).
There is a large body of research that demonstrates this relationship between
public preferences and policymakers’ priorities using different approaches
and methodologies (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1983; Page 1994; Stimson et al.
1995; Maravall 1999; Manin et al. 1999; Erikson et al. 2002). Despite this, as
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Manza and Lomax (2002) emphasise, although policy tends to follow public
opinion more often than not, the capacity of policymakers to respond to
citizens’ preferences varies across issues, across countries and across policy
venues, and these variations are partly explained by the institutional
arrangements governing the political system.
In order to capture how institutions have an impact on political
responsiveness (and policy dynamics), Jones and Baumgartner (2005) and
Jones et al. (2009) develop the concept of institutional friction. This concept
is measured by taking into account the transaction costs associated with a
particular policy venue and the number of individuals and collective actors
whose agreement is required for decision-making. According to Jones et al.
(2009), institutional friction is an important variable for explaining lack of
correspondence, reducing the chances of sudden policy changes and thus the
capacity of policymakers to respond rapidly to public preferences. It
increases as (1) the number of individuals or collective actors whose
agreement is required for a change in policy increases; and (2) as a proposal
moves through the policy stages (from very high for organic laws to very low
for speeches). In other words, institutional friction varies across policy
venues (speeches, oral questions, bills, laws) and increases as an issue moves
through the policy stages from agenda-setting actions (those that influence
which issues will be formally considered by the government and policy-
makers) to decision-making actions (formal decisions). The basic assump-
tion is that the capacity of policymakers to respond to citizens’ preferences
will vary across policy venues according to these differences in the level of
institutional friction: the greater the institutional friction, the lower the
capacity of representatives to respond to public demands in the short run.
Following this line of research we test this first hypothesis for the Spanish
case.
H1: Correspondence between public and policymakers’ priorities is
inversely related to institutional friction: the greater the institutional
friction, the less responsive a policymaking channel is to citizens’
preferences.
Institutional friction is an important variable explaining different levels of
correspondence across policy venues and time. However, as suggested by
different theoretical perspectives, correspondence also varies according to
other institutional factors that structure the functioning of the political
system at the macro level, such as the distribution of jurisdiction across
different levels of government. One of the most interesting debates about
political responsiveness relates to this process of increasing delegation of
political power to subnational and supranational institutions, and the
creation of multilevel systems of governance. As Scharpf (1999) argues, the
increase in the number of governments involved in the policymaking process
makes it less clear which government is doing what in relation to specific
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 709
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policy areas. The attribution of responsibilities for policy areas is less clearly
defined, which results in a reduction in the incentives of policymakers to pay
attention to public opinion. Each government can blame the other for
political inactivity, reducing the electoral costs incurred by a lack of
responsiveness.
From a different perspective, Soroka and Wlezien (2010) argue that
responsiveness to policy at any particular level of government will be
lower in federal than in unitary states, as responsibility for those issues
signalled as priorities by citizens is less clearly attributed. Thus, in federal
systems, responsiveness will be especially low in those policy areas where
there is overlapping jurisdiction. The analysis by Soroka and Wlezien
(2004, 2010) of the correspondence of public expenditure and public
opinion in the US, the UK and Canada, and the analysis by Jennings
and John (2009) of the Queen’s Speeches and public opinion in the UK
provide some evidence for this argument. Both illustrate how parliamen-
tary and governmental actors at national level are less responsive to
public opinion in those policy areas where regional or local governments
are involved.
Testing whether the distribution of jurisdiction across different levels of
governments has an impact on political responsiveness is especially
relevant for the Spanish case. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 defines a
quasi-federal system of political decentralisation, which changed the
fundamental pattern of politics in Spain after Franco’s death. This is a
quite open and flexible system of political decentralisation aimed at
accommodating different political positions and interests within the
structure of government during political transition (Linz and Stepan
2006; Tezanos et al. 1993). The creation of the Estado de las Autonomı´as
was the result of demands for self-rule by certain territorially-based
groups which reflect the distribution of power in Spanish society (Hooghe
et al. 2008; Requejo and Caminal 2010). Each of the 17 Comunidades
Auto´nomas (CCAA) has significant capacity to exercise authority in its
territory over a wide range of issues. More precisely, according to the
Spanish Constitution, the national government has the monopoly of
regulation over defence, foreign policy, justice, criminal and commercial
law, foreign trade, currency, citizenship, and customs and immigration,
while each CCAA can claim jurisdiction over a list of issues including
social welfare, police, economic issues like taxation, or cultural and
educational policy (Aja 2003).
Following Soroka and Wlezien (2010) we should expect differences in
responsiveness across these policy areas according to political jurisdiction.
In other words, for those issues over which the national government has
exclusive jurisdiction (like foreign affairs), correspondence between citizens’
priorities should be higher than for issues with shared jurisdiction (like
welfare-related issues). The overall degree of responsiveness could be
710 L. Chaque´s Bonafont and A. M. Palau
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significant, but regarding one level of government (the national level),
correspondence should be lower for those issues in which the national
government shares political responsibilities (in the regulation of issues or in
their implementation) with the CCAA. This lower level of correspondence
could be related to two different arguments: one possible explanation is that
Spanish national policymakers are not responding to citizens’ priorities
because they do not have jurisdiction to regulate or to go further in the
regulation of a particular issue. Another argument is more related to the
lack of political will of national policymakers to respond to citizens’
priorities, in a political context in which they can blame others for political
inactivity, avoiding the electoral costs deriving from lack of responsiveness.
In any case, we would expect that:
H2: Correspondence between public and policymakers’ priorities is
higher for those policy issues without shared jurisdiction: the lower the
degree of political decentralisation, the more correspondence between the
priorities of the public and political elites.
In order to analyse how institutions matter, we also consider the type of
government as an independent variable that may influence correspondence
between public and policymakers’ priorities (Lijphart 1999). We depart
from the idea that the cost of reaching a consensus in the Spanish
parliamentary system increases when the governing party does not have a
majority in Parliament. As in any other parliamentary system, we expect
that the incentives to make compromises are lower for an executive that
has a substantial majority, whereas an executive without a majority in the
legislature is forced to compromise more (Binzer and Klemmemsen 2008:
315). Therefore, when the Spanish executive does not have a majority, like
the first mandate of Jose´ M. Aznar (Partido Popular, PP) from 1996 to
2000 or Jose´ L. Rodrı´guez Zapatero (Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol,
PSOE) from 2004 to the present, it is expected that a wider range of
preferences of different political parties will be accommodated, and the
outcome is likely to be closer to the preferences of the majority of the
electorate. Soroka and Wlezien (2004: 8) employ a similar argument to
explain the case of Canada, arriving at the conclusion that under a
majority, ‘it is more difficult for opposition parties to undertake error
correction, adjusting the government’s positions where it may be going too
far or not far enough given public preferences’. On the basis of these
arguments, we would expect the prioritisation of issues by Spanish
political elites to vary according to whether the executive has a majority of
seats in Parliament or not.
H3: When the executive is a minority government, correspondence
between the priorities of the executive and public opinion is higher.
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 711
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Finally, we also consider whether the electoral process has an impact on
correspondence and whether political elites are more responsive to public
preferences when elections are closer. The parliamentary session before
elections is an important venue for giving visibility to those issues that
potentially maximise the votes of political parties. The basic assumption is
that the prioritisation of issues by political elites across different policy
venues (oral questions, bills, speeches) is the result of a rational process in
which policymakers, among other things, try to maximise their chances of
re-election. Hence political parties will give special attention to those issues
that are particularly salient to their voters immediately before elections as a
means of launching an electoral campaign and maximising their chances of
re-election (Kuklinski 1978; Sartori 1987; Jones 1994; Maravall 1999,
Klingemann et al. 2006). By the same token, policymakers will tend to give
special attention to public priorities during the parliamentary session
immediately after elections, when a new government has come into power.
As democracy is about the mandate that voters give parties to implement
their preferred policies, policymakers also take into account public
preferences when setting the agenda for the next legislature. Policymakers
commit themselves to achieving particular policy goals according to public
concerns because this is one of the basic elements of the functioning of a
representative democracy, but also because they are seeking future electoral
rewards (Manin et al. 1999). In short, the priorities of the public and
policymakers will match better during parliamentary sessions closer to
elections, as defined in our last hypothesis:
H4: Correspondence between the priorities of the public and policy-
makers is higher in election years.
Data and Methodology
To study issue prioritisation, we have created several databases following the
methodology of the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones
1993, Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In the case of the political agenda, each
speech, oral question, bill and law has been coded according to a universal
coding system based on 19 major topic categories and 247 subcategories
(Table 1). This coding system, first developed for the US, has been adapted to
the characteristics of the Spanish political system by introducing certain
revisions such as questions dealing with the national health system or ETA
terrorism. These databases cover the period 1977–2008 on laws (organic
laws, ordinary laws and decree-laws), executive and parliamentary group
bills, oral questions and Presidente del Gobierno speeches, and include in
total almost 30,000 records. Table 2 gives information on the 15,530 records
for the period considered in this analysis: 1994 to 2007.
712 L. Chaque´s Bonafont and A. M. Palau
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In order to assess the public agenda we rely on data collected by the
Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (CIS), which has reported citizens’
views on the most important problem (MIP) facing the nation since 1994.
Before 1994 the wording and format of the survey changed dramatically,
which limits the possibilities of measuring correspondence before then for
the case of Spain. MIP responses provide data on the problems people think
are most important for the nation. They illustrate which issues are salient to
the general public and reflect what problems most concern people. To avoid
problems related to the variability of question wording, we have coded the
answers to the question: ‘What is, in your opinion, the most important
problem that currently exists in Spain? And the second? And the third?’
from 1994 to 2007. This is an open, multi-answer question that provides
information on issue prioritisation, but not on citizens’ policy positions or
preferences for solutions. To translate CIS polls into issue attention
percentages we took three steps following Jones et al. (2009). First we coded
TABLE 1
ISSUE TOPICS OF THE COMPARATIVE AGENDAS PROJECT
1. Macroeconomics
2. Civil rights
3. Health
4. Agriculture
5. Labour
6. Education
7. Environment
8. Energy
10. Transportation
12. Internal affairs and justice
13. Social policy
14. Housing
15. Commerce and industrial policy
16. Defence
17. Science and technology
18. Foreign trade
19. International affairs
20. Government and public administration
21. Public lands and water management
TABLE 2
POLICYMAKING CHANNELS
Policymaking channel Records (1994–2008)
Organic laws 117
Ordinary laws 684
Decree-laws 205
Executive bills 622
Parliamentary bills 1100
Oral questions 7995
Speeches 4,807
Total 15,530
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 713
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each answer according to the Policy Agendas Project methodology; second,
we calculated for each poll the percentages for each issue category; finally,
we aggregated the data on an annual basis, taking average values in those
years where multiple polls were conducted.1
Evolution of Public and Political Agendas
Few issues capture most of the attention of Spanish public opinion. The
evolution of the economy, terrorism, political corruption and health issues
occupy a prominent place in the public agenda, capturing between 80 and 90
per cent of attention during the 1990s. In 1996, these four issues so
dominated the agenda (90.9 per cent) that there was little room for public
discussion of anything else (Figure 1). As a whole (1994 to 2008), economic
issues capture 34.6 per cent of the public agenda, justice and crime
(terrorism) 25 per cent, and government affairs and health issues about 8.3
per cent each. From the turn of the twenty-first century, policy areas
traditionally overlooked increasingly capture public attention (Figure 2). In
2006, 17.2 per cent of all responses fell into the category of rights
(representing only 0.53 per cent in 1995); housing issues also register a
significant increase with the new millennium (representing 12.8 per cent of
all responses in 2007, while only 1.3 per cent in 2001), and other issues like
defence, housing and/or transport also increase moderately in relation to
previous years.
FIGURE 1
MOST SALIENT ISSUES ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA (1994–2007)
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The questions to be answered are whether the issues that public opinion
defines as the most important are also the priorities of policymakers;
whether both the public and the executive have paid attention to similar
problems over the last 14 years; to what extent Jose´ M. Aznar and Jose´ L.
Rodriguez Zapatero have given more attention to rights, housing or
international affairs while giving their annual speeches; and whether the
issues addressed by parliamentary groups while introducing an oral question
or bill are changing in the same direction as public priorities. To answer
these questions we first describe issue prioritisation across different
policymaking channels, and in the next section we measure the correlation
between these venues and public opinion.
Table 3 gives information about the average percentage of attention given
to each topic in different policy venues. First, there are some issues that
always capture most of the attention of Spanish policymakers. Economic
issues, labour, crime, foreign affairs and government capture most attention
in all policymaking channels, with some exceptions in the case of
parliamentary bills. Parliamentary groups do not pay much attention to
foreign affairs (only 1.3 per cent) or economics (4.8 per cent), and focus
more on rights-related issues (9.9 per cent), education (7.4 per cent) and
social policy (8.4 per cent). Second, there are some issues that never capture
the attention of policymakers, such as energy, the environment, housing,
research and development, foreign trade, social policy and transport issues.
Here again there are two important exceptions: more than 8 per cent of the
oral questions presented over the last 14 years are devoted to transport
issues, and 8.4 per cent of parliamentary bills deal with social policy issues.
FIGURE 2
NEW ISSUES ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA (1994–2007)
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In addition, three of these issues – foreign trade, energy, and research and
development – are never mentioned as important by public opinion, which
could be seen as an indicator of the lack of visibility and opacity of the
policymaking process associated with these issues.
Third, there are some issues that have gained increased attention over
time. Table 4 provides information about the percentage of attention
devoted to each issue for the period 1994–2000 compared with that devoted
to the same issues in the new millennium (2001–07). First, there is only one
issue (rights) that captures an increasing amount of attention in all venues;
second, economic and industry-related issues have been gaining less and less
attention over the last decade (although they capture a sizeable share of the
political agenda for the whole period); third, some issues are especially
important in a particular venue: there are an increasing number of executive
bills about trade, an increasing number of laws on education, and an
increasing focus on labour, crime and justice (especially terrorism) and
rights issues in annual speeches. Finally, parliamentary groups are giving
special attention to welfare and rights issues through the introduction of
parliamentary bills, and to issues related to crime and international affairs
through oral questions.
Measuring Correspondence
To measure whether the issues that are the focus of policymaking activities
are also the priorities of the public, we construct a non-symmetrical
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF ATTENTION BY POLICY AREA (1994–2007)
MIP
Laws
(all types)
Parliamentary
bills
Executive
bills
Oral
questions Speeches
Economics 35.5 14.5 4.7 16.3 6.6 15.8
Rights 6.4 3.7 10.0 3.8 4.1 2.2
Health 8.6 3.5 2.1 3.1 6.3 2.5
Agriculture 0.4 4.6 1.5 4.2 6.8 1.0
Labour 2.6 6.1 9.6 5.2 3.8 10.9
Education 1.2 3.6 6.8 4.1 7.7 6.3
Environment 1.2 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.4 1.2
Energy 0.0 1.3 0.1 1.4 3.0 0.5
Transport 0.3 4.8 3.4 4.7 8.3 1.7
Crime 24.8 14.4 13.7 13.3 9.6 14.7
Welfare 3.4 1.2 7.3 1.0 2.2 2.7
Housing 4.0 0.9 2.8 1.3 2.3 1.6
Commerce 0.0 13.5 5.7 13.1 4.3 1.4
Defence 0.3 3.4 5.1 3.2 5.1 3.1
Science 0.0 2.9 4.5 3.6 4.5 2.8
Foreign trade 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.4
International 0.0 4.1 1.0 5.2 6.7 11.8
Government 8.3 9.9 15.8 9.1 11.2 17.1
Public lands 0.2 3.9 2.2 3.7 3.4 1.2
716 L. Chaque´s Bonafont and A. M. Palau
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ba
rce
lon
a] 
at 
06
:18
 14
 Ju
ly 
20
11
 
correspondence matrix following the research design developed by Jones
et al. (2009). The correspondence matrix masses correlations formed from
the priorities-by-time and the activities-by-time matrices for any one
policymaking channel. In the priorities-by-time matrix, each column is a
MIP topic (15 in total)2 and each row is a year. Each cell entry indicates the
percentage of the public that considers this topic to be the most important
problem facing the nation. In the activities-by-time matrix, each entry shows
the percentage of activity in a policy channel that is devoted to each of these
15 issues in a given year (14 in total). By estimating the correlation between
the priorities-by-time and the activities-by-time matrices we obtain the
correspondence matrix. Each entry in the matrix shows the correlation
between the proportion of all MIP responses dedicated to one issue and the
proportion of total activity in a policy channel devoted to the same issue
over the 14 years (14 annual observations).
As an illustration, Table 5 correlates MIP responses with speeches. We
observe that speeches, oral questions and decree-laws are the policymaking
channels that most strongly correlate with the priorities of the public.
Speeches and MIPs are strongly correlated (with statistically significant
correlations) with economics, rights, labour, transport, housing and
government affairs. Oral questions are strongly correlated with rights,
health, housing, defence and international affairs, and decree-laws with
agriculture, government affairs and public lands. The correlations are
weaker in the other policymaking channels, particularly with regard to
organic laws and parliamentary group bills (no statistically significant
TABLE 4
NEW ISSUES: PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1994–2000 AND 2001–2007
MIP
Laws
(all types)
Parliamentary
bills
Executive
bills
Oral
questions Speeches
Economics 712.61 1.18 1.82 0.09 0.16 78.87
Rights 9.23 2.29 3.37 2.76 0.64 2.84
Health 74.57 70.19 0.86 0.39 75.08 71.40
Agriculture 0.09 71.98 72.43 71.72 72.94 0.12
Labour 2.50 0.92 0.30 70.15 70.47 6.54
Education 0.85 0.91 73.15 70.91 0.30 3.06
Environment 70.20 1.76 70.01 1.50 1.34 1.36
Energy 0.00 70.12 0.19 70.74 0.47 0.26
Transport 0.42 1.55 71.17 70.55 71.87 1.91
Crime 6.47 70.10 74.01 2.57 1.84 5.47
Welfare 70.38 0.13 4.17 70.12 0.53 0.05
Housing 6.68 70.84 71.14 71.57 2.60 0.90
Commerce 0.00 3.62 0.57 8.64 0.73 71.40
Defence 0.66 0.05 72.72 70.32 70.67 71.17
Science 0.00 72.08 71.30 73.08 70.70 70.05
Foreign trade 0.00 70.85 70.68 0.15 0.14 70.86
International 0.07 72.99 1.31 76.57 2.26 71.03
Government 77.16 74.17 3.17 71.31 0.01 78.62
Public lands 70.57 0.89 0.54 0.93 0.86 0.90
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 717
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correlation), and ordinary laws and government bills (only one significant
correlation in the issue area of rights). The question is to what extent
institutional friction can explain these variations.
Institutional Friction and Correspondence
Table 6 ranks each policymaking channel considered in the analysis –
speeches, oral questions, bills and laws – according to the degree of
institutional friction (as defined above, cost required to come to an
acceptable agreement, including bargaining and institutionally-imposed
costs). This classification is based on the formal rules and institutional
arrangements associated with bills, laws, oral questions and speeches, as
defined by the Spanish Constitution and the statutes of the Congreso de los
Diputados and the Senate. Speeches – the discurso del candidato a la
Presidencia del Gobierno and the discurso del Presidente del Gobierno sobre el
Estado de la Nacio´n – have the lowest level of institutional friction and the
highest level of visibility among policymaking channels. They are one of the
most visible political events of the year, mainly because what the President
says is reported by the media and watched and debated by the public and
their representatives. There is no defined limit on the length of the speech,
but the cost of shifting speech attention to a new issue should be relatively
low compared to other types of activity. If the Presidente del Gobierno wants
to give more attention to an issue, he does not need the consent of other
political actors as is required (for example) to pass a law. In spite of this,
there are some differences between the two types of speech we are
considering here. In the case of the discurso de investidura, the candidate’s
speech is submitted to a final vote in the Congreso de los Diputados,
introducing an institutional cost that does not exist in the case of the
Discurso sobre el Estado de la Nacio´n.
Parliamentary control activities are policymaking channels with a low
level of institutional friction. They are usually reported by the mass media,
although their level of visibility is not as high as for speeches. In this analysis
we have only considered oral questions introduced in plenary meetings,
which are basically an instrument for supervising the implementation of
policy decisions by the executive. The introduction of an oral question is a
quite open process in which a single deputy or parliamentary group can be
involved. But as Wiberg (1995: 197) stresses, the introduction of an oral
question always comprises many stages involving the voluntary participa-
tion of at least three distinct types of actor: one or more MP, the Chairman
and other staff of the Parliament, and one or more minister. Oral questions
are submitted in writing 48 hours in advance of the regular question-time
session and presented orally by the relevant MP. They are always answered
in writing or orally, but this is not completely at the minister’s discretion,
because it is the Chairman, in collaboration with the other members of the
Parliament’s bureau and the Speakers, who sets the agenda. Accordingly,
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 719
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the ability of the MP and ministers to use oral questions as devices to
publicise good news or to delay reactions to bad news is controlled by the
Chairman and the Speakers. Finally, some restrictions exist regarding the
type of question that MPs are allowed to ask: they must be relevant, fall
directly under the responsibilities of the executive, and never deal with
personal or private matters, or disorderly expressions.
Bills are the third policy venue considered in the analysis. Bills are not
final policy decisions, but they do provide information about the direction
of policy and the legislative priorities of government and parliamentary
groups that goes beyond symbolic discussions about policy issues. In the
case of Spain, the introduction of a bill is an open process in which several
policy actors can participate – the executive, parliamentary groups of any of
the chambers, the general population and regional authorities (CCAA).
Institutional costs – areas of friction – are higher than for speeches and oral
questions, mainly because they require a first voting to get through the
legislative process. There are big differences between executive bills and the
rest. First, government bills are prioritised over any other bill introduced
during the same parliamentary period; and, second, the chances of passing a
government bill are higher. Almost 90 per cent of the bills introduced by
parliamentary groups have no chance of getting through the legislative
process, while almost 81 per cent of government bills are eventually passed.
In many cases, parliamentary bills are attention-seeking devices used by
political parties to weaken the executive, or simply to respond to the
preferences and demands of the electorate.
Finally, laws are the basic indicator for measuring the prioritisation of
issues in a particular polity. The level of institutional friction is higher than
for the rest of the policy venues, with big differences according to the type of
law. Organic laws are limited to certain issues – mainly fundamental rights
and public liberties, the general electoral system and modification of basic
institutions like the Constitutional Court – and, in order to be passed, an
overall majority of the Members of Congress is required. Decree-laws, on
the other hand, can only deal with issues that do not affect the regulation of
the basic institutions of the state, the rights, duties and liberties of the
citizens as regulated by Title I of the Constitution, the CCAA or general
electoral law; and they follow a special legislative process led by the
executive.
Table 7 summarises the correlation results between MIP and each
policymaking channel (each column represents the main diagonal from each
of the correspondence tables) and gives information about the number of
significant correlations and average correlations. We observe that, as
predicted by the institutional friction hypothesis, those policymaking
channels associated with a higher level of friction have a lower level of
correspondence with public priorities than those associated with a low level
of institutional friction. Organic laws have the lowest average correlation
(0.009) and have no significant correlation with any of the topics. As we
Spanish Policymakers and Citizens’ Priorities 721
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move from higher to lower levels of friction we observe that significant and
average correlations increase: ordinary laws have a 0.012 average correla-
tion (and 1 statistically significant issue), parliamentary group bills 0.016 (0
statistically significant issues), government bills 0.046 (1 statistically
significant issue), decree-laws 0.135 (3 statistically significant issues), oral
questions 0.154 (5 statistically significant issues) and speeches 0.278 (6
statistically significant issues). Figure 3 summarises the same information:
each bar shows the average correlation across issue areas in the different
policymaking channels.
The results presented so far indicate that institutional friction is an
important variable for explaining issue correspondence and that the
priorities of policymakers and public opinion match better at the agenda-
setting stage than at the decision-making stage. In other words, as Jones
et al. (2009) argue, correspondence is inversely related to institutional
friction; the higher the institutional friction, the less responsive a policy-
making channel is to citizens’ preferences. The question we address now is
whether other institutional factors such as type of government, elections and
political decentralisation can explain differences in political correspondence
not only across policy venues, but also across policy issues.
Elections, Type of Government and Issue Jurisdiction
The capacity of national policymakers to respond to public priorities varies
across issues depending on issue jurisdiction. We depart from the hypothesis
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE MIP ISSUE CORRELATIONS BY POLICYMAKING CHANNEL
(1994–2007)
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that the higher the degree of political decentralisation of an issue, the less
correspondence between citizens’ and policymakers’ priorities at national
level. In other words, parliamentary and government actors at national level
are less responsive to citizens’ preferences on those issues with shared
jurisdiction. According to the formal distribution of competences, issues like
defence or foreign affairs are exclusively regulated by central government,
while issues like health, education and the environment are issues with
shared jurisdiction – the central government enacts basic laws and the
CCAA have the capacity to enact laws and/or define implementation rules
(see Table 7).
Overall, the data illustrate that for those policy areas that are completely
or mostly regulated by national authorities there is a higher level of
correspondence, and this is especially true for general economic issues
(taxation and unemployment), government issues (regulation of political
parties), rights (immigration) and transport.3 The exceptions are issues such
as defence or international affairs, which have a low level of correspondence.
This is explained by the fact that they are rarely considered by public
opinion as the most important problem, but also because in both cases
policy decisions are often driven by governing obligations. The same is true
of foreign trade and some of the issues related to research and development
activities. Therefore, with most of the issues monopolised by the national
government, such as foreign affairs, defence, and foreign trade, citizens have
little direct involvement and rely on information and interpretation
provided by other actors, such as the media or political elites (Page and
Shapiro 1983).
The opposite is true of general economic issues, rights and government
issues. These capture a large share of the attention of both policymakers and
public opinion for the whole period, and they are strongly related to
dramatic events, and to the political transformations that have occurred in
the last two decades. Political corruption was one of the key issues during
the last legislature of Felipe Gonza´lez (1993–96), capturing almost 20 per
cent of the attention of the political agenda at that time; the evolution of the
economy is always an important concern of the executive, especially for the
first mandate of Jose´ M. Aznar (1996–2000) when Spain had to fulfil the
requirements of the European Monetary Union, while rights issues are one
of the main concerns of the first mandate of Jose´ L. Rodrı´guez Zapatero
(2004–08).
Results so far corroborate the second hypothesis – with the exception
of housing. Despite the fact that this is a decentralised issue, correspondence
is high and significant at the agenda-setting stage (speeches or oral
questions). Both the executive and parliamentary groups pay significant
attention to housing in order to show their concern for an issue that has
been identified by Spanish citizens as one of the most important problems
facing the nation over the last few years. But no important decisions are
made at national level, mainly because most of the political competences are
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delegated to regional governments. In short, the data discussed so far
illustrate that there is some connection between political decentralisation
and correspondence, especially in the case of highly visible issues like rights
or economic affairs. For those issues that are more distant from citizens and
more related to what is happening abroad, correspondence is lower
regardless of the level of political decentralisation.
Another question is whether correspondence varies according to the type
of government, and whether the executive is more attentive to the priorities
of the public under a minority government. In order to test this hypothesis,
we have compared the two legislatures governed by the PP, the first without
an overall majority from 1996 to 2000, and the second with a majority from
2000 to 2004. In this way we control for party ideology and the preferences
of the party leader (Jose M. Aznar), and also avoid the methodological
problems related to the greater number of years of minority government –
for the period analysed here, the executive only governed with an absolute
majority from 2000 to 2004. From the comparison of these two legislatures,
we can arrive at the conclusion that the priorities of the executive better
match public preferences under minority government than majority
government (Figure 4). As expected, government bills introduced under
majority rule are less related to public priorities than those introduced in the
previous legislature, which indicates the relative autonomy of the PP to
define its own legislative agenda when controlling a majority of seats in
Parliament.
However, for decree-laws and speeches, the results contradict our
hypothesis, i.e. correspondence is higher under majority than under
FIGURE 4
AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BY POLICYMAKING CHANNEL
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minority governments. In the case of decree-laws, this high correlation
under majority government is related to external events, and more
specifically to the mad cow scandal. Agricultural issues never capture much
public attention: only 0.53 per cent of Spanish citizens considered
agriculture the most important problem facing the nation for the period
1994 to 2007, but in January 2001, the MIP poll shows that food safety
issues are considered the most important problem in Spain after terrorism
and unemployment.4 In this context, from 2000 to 2004, 14.3 per cent of
decree-laws were related to agriculture, the second most important issue
regulated by decree-law (industrial policy being the first, capturing 38 per
cent of the total), and 50 per cent of them were related to food safety. In the
case of speeches, the explanation is related more to their low level of
institutional friction, which makes it easier for the President to respond to
changes in public opinion (Chaque´s et al. 2008).
Finally, in order to test whether the electoral process has an impact on
correspondence, we have calculated correlations between MIPs and different
policymaking channels for the six months before and after elections (Figure
5). In general terms, the average correlations illustrate that the executive and
parliamentary agendas match better with public preferences after elections.
The average correlation between public preferences and speeches is 0.28 for
the whole legislature and increases to 0.45 after elections, while no
important variations occur before elections. The opposite occurs for
executive bills: the average correlation increases from 0.05 to 0.16 before
elections, while no variations exist after elections. In the case of oral
questions and parliamentary group bills, the results are quite contradictory:
FIGURE 5
CORRELATION MIP AND POLICYMAKING CHANNELS
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in both cases, public and policymakers’ preferences match better after
elections (in the case of oral questions, average correspondence increases
from 0.15 to 0.34, while for parliamentary bills it increases from 0.02 to
0.11), but the opposite occurs before elections.
Hence our overall results illustrate that, for the six months before
elections, issue correspondence tends to decrease (bills and oral questions)
or variation is almost non-existent (speeches), with the sole exception of
executive bills. On the other hand, for the six months after elections, the
results seem to support our hypothesis: correspondence tends to increase in
the case of speeches, oral questions and parliamentary bills, and remains
constant in the case of executive bills. However, at this point it is difficult to
arrive at any conclusions about the impact of elections on issue
correspondence. The results presented here seem to indicate that parlia-
mentary groups do not change their strategies concerning oral questions and
parliamentary bills before elections. It is more during the first months of the
legislature that they tend to give more visibility to those issues which are
gaining special attention among the public by introducing a bill and/or oral
questions. Finally, the executive seems to behave more strategically with
regard to public preferences than parliamentary groups, especially in the
case of speeches after elections. Still, the results only give partial support to
the fourth hypothesis. Political elites in Spain seem to be more predisposed
to express attitudes or prescribe policies consistent with public preferences
when setting up the agenda right after elections, but not before.
Conclusions
For the last 15 years Spanish policymakers have followed public priorities,
although some important differences exist across policy venues and issues.
Our results indicate that institutional friction, political decentralisation,
elections and type of government matter and are important variables in
explaining why Spanish political elites are responding closely to some of the
issues prioritised by the public, and why the distance between policy
decisions and the issues signalled as preferred by citizens increases during
certain periods. We argue that the priorities of Spanish citizens and political
elites match better when institutional friction is lower, and this is especially
true when the Presidente del Gobierno gives his annual speech and when
political parties introduce oral questions. The Spanish case also illustrates
that policymakers are more responsive to public priorities under minority
governments and immediately after elections. Before elections only the
executive, by introducing government bills, responds more directly to the
priorities of the public as a means to obtain electoral advantage. After
elections, both the executive and parliamentary groups, while introducing
oral questions and bills, respond more directly to public priorities than at
any other time in the legislature. Further analysis should be undertaken in
order to capture differences in correspondence before and after elections
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across policy issues, and this involves the introduction of other explanatory
variables, such as party ideology.
Finally, our results also indicate that correspondence between the
priorities of citizens and policymakers is higher for those policy issues
without shared jurisdiction, like immigration, with the exception of those
issues that are more related to what is happening abroad. At this point it is
difficult to say whether the lower level of correspondence associated with
those issues with shared jurisdiction is a direct response of Spanish political
elites to the formal definition of issue jurisdiction across levels of
government, or whether it is more related to the policymakers’ lack of
political will to respond to citizens’ priorities. The consolidation of a
multilevel system of government increases the opportunities to blame others
for political inactivity and thus reduce the electoral costs deriving from the
lack of responsiveness. A question for future research is whether political
elites, in this multilevel system of government, are increasingly less involved
in the discussion and resolution of some issues which are especially
controversial or costly in political terms, or whether on the contrary there is
an increasing involvement of policymakers at regional level to respond more
closely to the priorities of citizens.
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Notes
1. The number of polls conducted varies across years. For example, the MIP question was
asked three times in 1993 and 10 times in 2001.
2. Four issues included in the policy agendas codes (commerce, energy, science and technology,
and foreign trade) are never mentioned by respondents as the most important problem facing
the nation.
3. The criteria used to identify whether an issue has exclusive or shared jurisdiction is based on
the formal definition established in the Spanish Constitution and adapted to our coding
system. When we define a policy area as having shared jurisdiction, this means that most of
the issues included in this policy area are regulated by both the national government and the
CCAA (as is the case of health, education and the environment). When we define a policy
area as the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government, this means that most of the
issues included in this policy area are completely or mostly regulated by national authorities,
e.g. taxation, energy and transport.
4. As a whole, 2.47 per cent of the MIP answers identify agriculture as being the most
important problem.
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